How the Indian Constitution defines Right to Property?

Reviewed by on December 4, 2014

The Constitution of India no longer recognises the right to property as a fundamental right. In 1978, the 44th Amendment Act repealed Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 (the property provisions taking effect on 20 June 1979), removing the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property from the list of fundamental rights. At the same time, Article 300-A was inserted into the Constitution to declare that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The effect is that the right to property is now a constitutional and legal right under Article 300-A rather than a fundamental right.

The term property, in Indian contexts, conception and experiences has a completely different historical base than that of western countries. The notion of property in India has witnessed a hugely advanced exposure in the past 20 years, after the Govt. adopted the policy of hardcore liberalization.

As per the provisions described in Indian Constitution, the right to property is associated with the question of how the property and the pressures related to it, should be cared for and handled.

The tale of administrative control of the right to property started with the First Amendment Act, 1951 by which the Articles 31-A and 31-B were embedded into the Constitution. Article 31-A was presented by the Constitution- First Amendment Act, 1951 wherein the Parliament characterized ʺestateʺ and proceeded by further corrections to stretch out its importance to appreciate essentially the whole farming land in the country region including waste grounds, timberland terrains, terrains for pasture or sites of buildings and construction.

The present constitutional position on the right to property

A short overview of the constitutional provisions, as they stand after the 44th Amendment, can be summarised as follows:

(1) The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is no longer a fundamental right. Until 1978 it was protected under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31; both provisions were repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.

(2) The right to property now survives as a constitutional and legal right under Article 300-A, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

(3) Because it is no longer a fundamental right, a deprivation of property cannot, by itself, be challenged directly under Article 32 for violation of a fundamental right; relief is sought on the ground that the deprivation is not backed by a valid law.

(4) Article 300-A requires that any deprivation be by “authority of law” — that is, by a validly enacted statute and not by mere executive action.

(5) The State may still acquire or requisition private property for a public purpose, but only under the authority of a law; the courts have read a duty to pay fair compensation into Article 300-A in such cases.

(6) Laws of agrarian reform affecting rights in an “estate” continue to be protected, including through Articles 31-A and 31-B and the Ninth Schedule, subject to the limits laid down by the Supreme Court.

(7) The shift from a fundamental right to a constitutional right under Article 300-A was intended to give the legislature greater flexibility to carry out land reform and redistribution while still requiring lawful authority for any deprivation of property.